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Arms control is a problem of social sys-
tems rather than of physical systems, even
though physical systems such as weapons,
satellites, and inspection devices may be
deeply involved in it. A weapon, however,
is not a physical thing-it is a physical thing
in a social situation. The most innocuous
object can become a weapon in the right
social situation, and the most destructive de-
vice ceases to be a weapon if nobody wants
to use it and nobody is afraid of it. It is to
social systems, therefore, that we must look
if we are to understand the arms race, and
if we are to find out how to stop it and to
. reverse it.
As we look for light on this question it is
useful to look at other social systems with
the properties with which we are, perhaps,
more familiar, and yet which exhibit in
some degree the properties of the arms race.
There is a striking analogy, for instance,
between the problem of inflation and its
control and the problem of the arms race
and its control. Inflation is a disease of the
price system in much the same way that the
arms race is a disease of the threat system.
In the price system it is only relative prices
that are significant. If we were to double
all wages and prices, for instance, the wage
earner would not be any better off, and if
the change were uniform throughout the sys-
tem, which of course it never is, a rise in all
prices and incomes in the same proportion
would amount to little more than a change
in the name that we give to a unit of money.
Similarly, in what might be called the
organized threat system as represented by
the armed forces of the world, it is the rela-
tive sizes of these armed forces, and the
relative threats which they represent to each
other and to the people who pay for them,
which constitute the essence of the system.
In military terms it is only relative strength
that is significant, not absolute strength. A
nation increases its absolute strength by de-
voting a larger budget to its armed forces
in the hope that this will increase its relative
strength. If, however, its potential enemies
perceive that their security is threatened by
this, and they in turn increase their own
armed forces, the relative positions may re-
turn to where they started. Nobody is any
more secure absolutely, but everybody is
worse off absolutely because resources
are devoted to armaments which might
have been devoted to other things. Just as
an inflation frequently arises because the
various groups in the society, including the
government, are each trying to get a larger
total sum of product for themselves than the
total product permits, so an arms race arises
when the various nations are trying to get
more security for themselves at the expense
of less security for others, and everybody
wants more security in toto than the tech-
nological and political situation permits.
The hope for disarmament arises because
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it is clear that after an arms race has pro-
ceeded for some time, every nation partici-
pating in it would be better off absolutely,
and would not be much changed in relative
position, if the total amount spent on armed
forces were very much reduced, as long as
the distribution of the reduction is carefully
arranged. There is clearly a bargaining situ-
ation here, in the sense that there is some
position of the world in which everybody
could be better off than he is now. It is
this fact that a bargaining situation exists
which makes the hope of disarmament so re-
silient, and explains why, in spite of all re-
buffs and discouragements, the hope of dis-
armament refuses to die. Nevertheless, as
everyone is aware, the achievement of the
bargain is a matter of great difficulty. There
have been one or two disarmament agree-
ments in history but they have been rare.
Here again the analogy with inflation may
be helpful, though it should not be pushed
too far. Inflation is an &dquo;easy&dquo; process be-
cause it gives all the parties a temporary
illusion of being in a relatively better posi-
tion. Deflation is a difficult and a painful
process, so painful indeed that in our society
it has become virtually impossible without
severe social dislocation. Even the cessation
of inflation in a society which has had a
long one is a painful and difficult process.
It is not, however, an impossible thing to do,
and many societies have done it. Especially
where people have become disgusted with
the superficially attractive but bitter fruit of
inflation, they have developed enough moti-
vation and self-control to control it. Simi-
larly, the arms race is easy, for each step
gives the party that makes it an illusion of
greater security. Arms control and disarma-
ment are harder as they require long-
sightedness, self-control, and a higher level
of social organization.
The distinction between arms control and
disarmament has been stressed in some re-
cent literature, but from the point of view
of the dynamics of the world war industry,
the distinction is a tenuous one. We may
think perhaps of arms control as consisting
of simply stopping the arms race so that we
do not all make ourselves absolutely worse
off. We may then perhaps think of disarma-
ment as the process of actively and continu-
ally reducing the amount of economic re-
sources spent on the world war industry so
that we may all be absolutely better off. In
both cases, however, it is the same system
with which we are dealing. It is easier, per-
haps, to achieve arms control than disarma-
ment in the above sense, though even this
may be questioned. If arms control is de-
fined in the broad sense of T. C. Schelling,
as a military cooperation with potential ene-
mies, this represents a fundamental change
from an uncontrolled and purely reactive
system. The change in the international sys-
tem implied in the shift from an uncontrolled
arms race to a system of arms control is
much more drastic than the change implied
from a stabilized level of armaments to a de-
clining one, and I suspect that if we can
solve the first problem, it will be relatively
easy to solve the second.
The political pressure for arms control,
and beyond arms control for disarmament,
arises, I suspect, from two sources. One is
the sheer economics of the situation and the
feeling that the $120 billion a year which
the human race spends on the world war
industry is a shocking waste of resources
which can ill be spared from more important
tasks such as economic development. Any-
one who is not ashamed of the fact that the
world is spending $120 billion a year on the
means of destruction is in pretty poor stand-
ing as a human being and as a member of
the crew of this overcrowded spaceship.
This is a crucial period in the history of the
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planet; we now have a chance of achieving
a stable high-level society on a world scale
in which the major sources of human misery
-hunger, poverty, and disease-will be
eliminated. We may never eliminate unhap-
piness but we can at least eliminate misery!
Our chance of doing this, however, is re-
duced by every dollar we spend on the war
industry. Even in the affluent United States
the war industry is a severe drain, especially
on our intellectual and organizational re-
sources, of which it absorbs a very large pro-
portion, and our poor growth rate and our
inability to solve many internal problems
can largely be attributed to it.
The case for disarmament is further
strengthened, however, when we ask what it
is we are buying with this $120 billion a
year. The answer seems to be an increase in
insecurity, fear, and an absolute diminution
in the power of the larger states. When, after
spending $500 billion on defense in ten
years, the armed forces of the United States
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have to turn around and say to the civilian
population, &dquo;Dig your own holes, boys,&dquo; it
is obvious that something has gone radically
wrong. Furthermore, when the fear of esca-
lation makes it all but impossible for the
United States to do anything in a military
way about Cuba, and when, similarly, the
Soviet Union cannot even handle Albania,
it would seem again that something has gone
radically wrong. It is the almost unconscious
recognition of the depth of the crisis of the
defense system which provides the steam for
the movement towards arms control and dis-
armament. We are all looking for a form
of national and personal security which will
be less costly and more secure than what we
have now. We are suffering from an enor-
mous inflation of the defense system which
has increased nobody’s relative security, has
diminished everybody’s absolute security,
and has likewise diminished everybody’s ab-
solute welfare.
This crisis of the defense system which
we are now facing is, paradoxically enough,
a result of the very inner dynamic of the
armed forces themselves, particularly as ex-
pressed in research and development. It is
hardly an exaggeration to say that the armed
forces have researched themselves into ob-
solescence. It is the very fact that the arms
race, since the end of the Second World
War, has taken the form of a research and
development race, almost as much as a
quantitative expenditure race, that gives
uniqueness to the present moment in his-
tory. We have never had a situation like this
in which weapons development has been so
divorced from the use of the weapons de-
veloped. As Herman Kahn has expressed it,
if we count the development between the
First and the Second World Wars as a &dquo;gen-
eration,&dquo; we now go through a generation of
development every three or four years. On
this scale it is already too late for the third,
or the fourth, or even the fifth world war.
We are about ready for the sixth or the
seventh. This means that the nations of the
world are operating in a military system the
properties of which they do not know, and it
is this fact which gives the present moment
its peculiar danger.
More than anything else, the collapse of
the defense system is a result of the increase
in the range of the deadly missile. I have
pointed out in Conflict and Defense (Bould-
ing, 1962) that the range of the deadly
missile is the main factor determining the
minimum size of the unconditionally viable
defense organization. The longer the range
of the deadly missile, the larger must be the
organization which is to be successfully de-
fended by it. We are now rapidly approach-
ing the stage in which the range of the deadly
missile is half the circumference of the
earth, or 12,500 miles. This means that the
only organization which can be defended by
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these instruments is mankind as a whole.
We have, therefore, come to the end of a
very long process and have reached a pro-
found break in the continuity of history.
Up to this point history has been a long
process by which we have learned to increase
the range of the deadly missile from that of
David’s slingshot through Alexander’s armies
(for an army itself can be thought of as a
deadly missile) to the latest ICBM. This
process has gone hand in hand with an in-
crease in the minimum size of the uncondi-
tionally viable state, till now we have gotten
to the point where the only unit that can be
defended is mankind as a whole. We have
come to the point, in other words, where war
must be abolished and we must establish the
institutions and habits of stable peace. The
search for negotiated arms control and dis-
armament is only a part of this process, and
perhaps not even the most important part.
We achieved personal disarmament over a
large part of the world by a combination of
unlilateral decisions on the part of individ-
uals as they developed skill in the handling
of quarrels without weapons, reinforced by
the establishment of law and order and a
little second-strike capability in the hands of
the sheriff. It may be that we shall get na-
tional disarmament also by a complex set of
processes in which graduated unilateral dis-
armament, both reciprocated and unrecipro-
cated, will play a part; in which the estab-
lishment of international organizations
capable of interposing themselves between
quarreling parties will also play a part; and
in which military cooperation among poten-
tial enemies will also play a part. It is de-
sirable that all these lines be pursued simul-
taneously with a concentrated intellectual ef-
fort applied to each.
The role of the universities, both in the
smaller problem of bargaining for arms con-
trol and disarmament agreements and in the
larger problem of establishing a stable
peace, is likely to be central and crucial.
The university is the only agency in society
which is committed to the future rather than
to the past, which is committed to mankind
as a whole rather than to any segment of it,
and which is committed to the truth rather
than to any particular version of it. Univer-
sities as institutions have frequently fallen
short of these ideals. In some cases they
have been so wedded to the task of transmit-
ting the heritage of the past that they have
ceased to do effective research, and the
development of knowledge, as in the early
origins of science, has had to proceed largely
outside their walls. This, fortunately, is no
longer true of most universities, especially
in this country, though there are still insti-
tutions in some parts of the world which
are not very far removed from the condi-
tion, shall we say, of Oxford in the time of
Adam Smith.
There are universities also, like those of
Nazi Germany, which have prostituted them-
selves in the service of a single country or
race. There is, indeed, a delicate balance to
maintain here between a proper loyalty to
the culture and the country in which the
institution is located and that wider com-
mitment to the human universe which the
name university implies. Here again, I think
we can take a modest satisfaction in our
own achievements; the great universities of
this country are no less American for being
great world institutions, opening their re-
sources with warmth and generosity to
people of every land and race and taking all
knowledge for their province.
Universities, as institutions, have not al-
ways been guiltless as an institution of com-
mitting themselves so deeply to some par-
ticular doctrine or vision of truth that they
have been blind to new truth as it has arisen.
Even in this country, we have our own
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orthodoxy and we persecute those who
deny it in a thoroughly unsportsmanlike
fashion. Our orthodoxy, however, is a broad
and latitudinarian one. Our gate is so wide
that the earnest searcher after truth hardly
notices it and pursues his way unhampered.
In this, too, we are more fortunate than
most, and we have correspondingly the
greatest responsibility.
The responsibility of the university is fur-
ther underlined because, at the moment at
least, the road to stable peace is blocked by
sheer ignorance of how to attain it. A major
part of the task of establishing stable peace,
therefore, is an intellectual task which is
peculiarly in the province of the university.
This is the task of understanding the world
social system and especially its immensely
complex dynamic processes, for without
understanding these processes our actions,
however well intentioned, will inevitably be
blind. We have a task before us also of
establishing a system of information collec-
tion and processing by which images of the
world social system, and especially of the
international system, can be tested for real-
ity. Operating agencies such as the State
Department and the Department of Defense
cannot be expected to do either the basic
theoretical work or the work in developing
an objective and scientific information pro-
cessing system which will be necessary if we
are to make the transition from the unstable
peace in which we now live to the stable
peace that we all hope for. Operating
agencies are quite rightly preoccupied with
day-to-day matters and concerned with oper-
ating the existing system rather than with
searching for ways in which it may be im-
proved.
Morton Kaplan distinguishes between
what he calls the &dquo;task&dquo; and the &dquo;meta-task.&dquo;
The task is doing something which seems
to be prescribed by the existing system; the
meta-task is asking whether the task itself
should be done or whether some other task
should be substituted. Operating agencies
of any kind have to concentrate on the best
way of getting something done. The task
is usually taken for granted because to ques-
tion it would imperil the very operation it-
self. Operating agencies, therefore, are al-
ways in grave danger of concentrating all
their energies on finding the best way of
doing something which should not be done
at all. This danger is particularly high in
times of very rapid change in the social
system, like the present. Under these cir-
cumstances, experience, and the wisdom that
is derived from experience, is a poor guide
to the future, and it is all the more impor-
tant to put substantial resources into the
meta-tasks of finding out how the system
is changing, what tasks have become obso-
lete, to what extent the wisdom of experi-
ence has suddenly turned into folly, and
what tasks, in the light of the rapidly chang-
ing social system, are possible and what are
impossible. Without somebody to perform
the meta-tasks we would still be trying to
squarc the circle, invent perpetual motion,
and devise the best methods for practic-
ing magic and alchemy. In the field of social
systems most of the operating agencies are
still in the age of alchemy, and it is not sur-
prising that their operations usually turn out
so badly.
The meta-task, however, cannot be per-
formed in a vacuum. The university as a
meta-task agency performs best when it is
independent of, but not isolated from, the
operating agencies whose main function is
the task itself. It must be independent or
it will be swallowed up in the task itself
and the meta-task will not be performed.
There is real danger of this, especially in
the light of the enormous pressures on the
universities for applied research. Neverthe-
less, the university must not be isolated; it
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must be deeply involved in the society in
which it is imbedded. Otherwise the task
which the operating agencies are performing
will remain unquestioned and the new tasks
which the university is suggesting will not be
carried out. We should not despise the ivory
tower; for many purposes it is necessary;
but we should see that it is provided with
good elevator service and that there is a
good vulgar TV set in every room.
One would like to see, therefore, corre-
sponding to every operating agency and to
every division of government, and for that
matter to every major segment of the busi-
ness world and the economy, a correspond-
ing research agency in the university, in
close contact with a research division of the
operating agency itself. The research agency
in the university would be free to follow
the inner dynamic of science, to develop
wild ideas and intellectual mutations, and
also to develop rigorous means of testing
reality. The research division in the operat-
ing agency will properly be more concerned
with day-to-day problems, with short-run
views, and with easy and inaccurate answers
to difficult but pressing questions. Then
one would like to see these two modes of
intellectual endeavor have equal social status,
so that they could establish close and con-
stant contact with each other through the
circulation of personnel, through confer-
ences and journals, and through the establish-
ment of a common frame of communica-
tion and discourse. It is only as we establish
an interlocking chain of personal communi-
cation that the gap between the meta-task
and the task can be filled. Practice must
constantly be translated into theory and
theory back into practice if we are to estab-
lish a cumulative process of increasing knowl-
edge and skill.
The Center for Research on Conflict Reso-
lution has welcomed the establishment of
the Institute for Arms Control and Peace
Research. The center is primarily concerned
with the development, on the one hand, of
both an adequate theoretical structure and
reality-testing apparatus for the international
system and for conflict processes in general,
and an information-processing apparatus
which will act as a check on our perceptions
of social reality in this field. We are not
equipped, nor should we be equipped, to
deal with the daily problems of negotiators
in Geneva or with the formulation of
position papers for the State Department.
Up to now, however, our lines of communi-
cation both to and from the decision-makers
have been few. We particularly welcome the
Institute for Arms Control and Peace Re-
search, therefore, as an intermediary as well
as an intellectual enterprise in its own right.
The structure which seems to be developing
at The University of Michigan, therefore,
may make a unique contribution not only to
the solution of the problems in which it is
specifically engaged but as the possible fore-
runner of a general pattern of intellectual
organization, in which pure research, applied
research, operating research, and operations
themselves are linked through a chain of
agencies each of which has close contact and
communication with those nearest to it. By
means of this kind of intellectual organization
the ivory tower can be saved from sterility
and from preoccupation with unreal prob-
lems entirely of its own making, and the
laborer in the dusty vineyards can be saved
from the endless repetition of habitual but in-
efficient tasks. It may well be, therefore, that
our intellectual and organizational response
to this number one problem of our day, the
establishment of stable peace, may have a
carry-over in many other fields of human
life and endeavor, and that in this genera-
tion we may hope to learn something that
the human race for unnumbered ages will
never want to forget.
